INTRODUCTION
tually the whole population of Dutch listed industrial companies which have adopted multiple defense mechanisms. Hostile takeover bids are rare in the Netherlands, and were successful, at most, on a few occasions.
The issue of corporate governance is also interesting in an international setting because it differs The reason is that stock exchange listed companies are protected by multiple takeover defenses. from country to country. For example, there is an active takeover market in the U.S.A. and the Around the turn of the twentieth century, defense mechanisms started to be used to protect Dutch U.K., but this is not so in many other countries.
There, as for example, shareholders are concorporations from foreign influences. Later on, they were applied to restrict the power of com-sidered to be one group of stakeholders in a firm next to employees, suppliers and customers. The mon shareholders. The use of defense measures to repel corporate raids and unfriendly takeovers equity ownership is also concentrated in the hands of a few investors. Although the pattern of crosshas become more important since the 1960s, and has received both criticism and support from shareholdings in German and Japanese companies may look similar, the governance structures are various interest groups. Public corporations have been devoting time and resources toward quite dissimilar. German firms have close relationships with banks which supply both equity developing diverse tactics to defend against unfriendly takeovers. As a result, the external capital and debt. In contrast, Japanese firms are characterized by large industrial groups with market for corporate control plays a diminished disciplinary role in the Netherlands. An issue interlocking directorships. Hostile takeovers are virtually nonexistent in Germany and the Netherdeserving investigation is under what circumstances this disciplinary mechanism becomes inef-lands, but due to two different reasons. Extensive cross-shareholdings provide German companies fective. To address this issue, we investigate virwith a strong defense, while Dutch companies are protected by multiple antitakeover devices. These and other differences imply that the influ-from country to country. The takeover market is ownership concentration and takeover defense measures.
1 a relatively more important disciplinary mechanism in the U.S.A. and the U.K. But, for Germany Incentives as well as the degree of monitoring can vary depending on the stakes and the types and the Netherlands, concentrated ownership and supervisory boards exert a relatively more of shareholders. One may be interested to know how institutional shareholders, as a separate important role. Various antitakeover measures are adopted in the U.S.A. to protect the interests of group, affect corporate decision making. These investors-usually banks, insurance companies, shareholders during takeover bids. But, in the Netherlands these measures are primarily directed pension funds and mutual funds-are expected to play a more active role in the affairs of a to limit the power of common shareholders.
A vast literature addresses the interrelationship company. They are in a better position to invest resources for increased monitoring so that manbetween ownership structure and different corporate governance devices. Walsh and Seward agement's inclination to adopt defense mechanisms decreases. On the other hand, some insti-(1990) examine different internal and external mechanisms of corporate control used in aligning tutional investors may align with management because of commercial ties and profitable busithe diverse interests of managers and shareholders. Important internal control mechanisms ness opportunities. The role actually played by institutional shareholders, therefore, becomes an include the control function of the board of directors, competition within the managerial team, and empirical issue. 2 Although it has been argued that large sharethe monitoring role of large shareholders. The external control mechanisms, on the other hand, holders who are effective monitors will prevent managers from adopting defensive measures, one are the market for corporate control and the competition in the product market. Walsh and can not be sure if shareholders in general are harmed by such adoptions. In fact, adoption of Seward (1990) argue that the failure of one control mechanism triggers the presence of another takeover defenses is usually explained under two competing hypotheses (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; mechanism. Studies by Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) , Ambrose and Megginson (1992) , and Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993) . According to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, defense Gordon and Pound (1993) also suggest that differences in firms' ownership structure (internal measures primarily protect poorly functioning management by reducing the probability of potencontrol aspect) can explain observed variations in antitakeover defenses (external control aspect). tial takeover. These measures help incumbent management to abuse their power by acting in The notion can be illustrated in the following way.
their own interest at the expense of shareholders. On the other hand, the shareholder interest Shareholders with large stakes are expected to participate actively in managerial decision making hypothesis postulates that adoption of defense measures allows current management to focus on (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 ). They will not in their own interest allow man-long-term strategies of the firm while remaining protected from the worry of hostile takeovers. agers to adopt defensive measures, as disciplining will be more difficult. The same is true for large Through a strong negotiating position, managers can also help shareholders to obtain a but passive shareholders who will also try to resist any attempt by managers to adopt defenses. fairer/higher premium if a takeover does take place. This is because any future possibility of gain through facilitating a third-party takeover will Empirical studies from the U.S.A. document then be reduced. Shareholders with small holdings, on the other hand, may not take an active 1 Although several studies have examined empirically the relationship between equity ownership and firm value (e.g., interest in monitoring management, perhaps McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Slovin and Sushka, 1993), because of the 'free-rider' problem. Defense mealimited attention has been given to explore ownership concensures are then relatively easily adopted by man-tration vis-à-vis multiple defense measures. 2 Empirical evidence on the mixed role of institutional shareagers because there are no large shareholders to holders can be observed from different studies, such as Agracounteract management's attempt. The purpose of wal and Mandelker (1990) , Bhagat and Jefferis (1991), Brick- the study is, therefore, to test empirically this ley, Lease, and Smith (1988) , Duggal and Millar (1994) , Pound (1988) , Shivdasani (1993) and Van Nuys (1993). theoretically predicted relationship between firms' that while some defense mechanisms are harmful systems (Franks and Mayer, 1990) . Moerland (1995) distinguishes two basic types of corporate for shareholders, others are not.
3 This study, therefore, reexamines the valuation impact of systems: the market-oriented system (prevailing in the U.S.A. and the U.K.) and the networkdefense measures, using the Dutch data. If shareholders of Dutch companies interpret the adoption oriented system (prevailing in, for example, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Japan). The of defense measures as managerial entrenchment, stock prices should decline. Alternatively, if these former is characterized by relatively developed financial markets, large-scale presence of corporameasures allow management to bargain for a higher takeover premium, share prices should tions with widely dispersed ownership, and active markets for corporate control. The latter system, increase.
The wealth effect of defense measures needs on the other hand, features closely held corporations, group membership of corporations, and subto be examined in conjunction with the ownership structure of firms. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) stantial involvement of banks in corporate financing and corporate control. These differences in document that value-reducing takeover defenses are adopted by firms with larger insider holdings governance systems are also reflected in differences in adoption of specific defense devices. and smaller institutional holdings. McWilliams (1990) finds that defense measures induce posiThere exist a variety of ways to classify takeover defenses. These can be either structural or tive effects on shareholder wealth for firms with low insider share ownership. Agrawal and Man-technical. The first type arises from prevailing structures of stock market and equity ownership delker (1990) report that the effect is more favorable the larger the level of institutional ownership. (e.g., relative importance of debt financing, crossholdings). The second type of defenses are Song and Walkling (1993) find that managerial ownership is related both to the probability of specifically directed to impede hostile takeover attempts (e.g., issuing preferred defense shares, being a takeover target and to increments in target shareholder returns. Given these findings, we limiting voting power). According to one study, 4 structural barriers to takeovers are relatively examine if the shareholders wealth effect of takeover defenses is related to ownership structure. strong in Italy, France, Germany and Switzerland, and of medium strength in Spain and Sweden, but The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Important takeover defense measures are weak in the Netherlands and the U.K. Technical measures, on the other hand, are relatively strong first discussed with particular emphasis on those prevailing in the Netherlands. The following two in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, of medium strength in Italy, France, Spain and sections describe the sample and the methodology. The results are presented in the next sec-Sweden, and weak in the U.K.
Defense mechanisms are also classified accordtion. A brief summary of the study and the research implications are presented in the final ing to shareholders' approval (Ruback, 1988) .
Some defenses require shareholders' approval section.
before adoption. These include super-majority provisions, fair-price amendments and classified boards. Other measures may be adopted by man-
TAKEOVER DEFENSE MEASURES
agement without requiring shareholders' approval. Examples include poison pills and targeted Takeover defense measures help to make acquisition of a company more difficult, if not impos-share repurchases.
The Dutch situation offers companies numerous sible, and thereby serve to insulate managers from the free market for corporate control. These possibilities of defense mechanisms, many of which do not exist in the U.S.A. These include measures vary from country to country depending on institutional features and corporate governance (a) legal measures such as the creation of structure companies ('structuur vennootschappen'); (b) statutory measures such as issuing preferred 3 DeAngelo and Rice (1983) Ryngaert (1988) find a significant negative share price effect.
Consultants, Amsterdam, 1990. defense shares, issuing priority shares, making company management to issue preferred shares whenever necessary and thus, grant substantial binding appointments of directors and limiting voting power per shareholder; and (c) nonstatu-voting power to another entity.
The procedure of defense with preferred shares tory measures such as the issue of depository receipts of shares ('certificaten van aandelen'). takes place in three consecutive steps. First, common shareholders approve the necessary charter Some important features of these antitakeover devices are explained below.
amendment to create the possibility of issuing preferred shares. Second, company management The law on 'structure companies' compels a large firm to establish a 'supervisory board' grants the option to a friendly party-usually a specially created foundation and/or an insti-(consisting of outsiders and different interest group representatives). This board (thus, not the tutional investor. Third, management decides to issue preferred share. This usually happens when shareholders of the company) in turn appoints a 'management board' to run day-to-day affairs of there is a fear of unfriendly takeover attempt.
These three steps follow one after another, but the firm. Many decisions of the 'management board', such as adoption of annual accounts, do not necessarily take place simultaneously. A company may create the possibility to issue preinvestment plans and company restructuring, require approval of the 'supervisory board', which ferred defense shares at a certain point of time, while the shares are actually issued several years meets on a few occasions per year. Priority shares are issued to a friendly foundation which reserves later (depending on any threat of hostile takeover). the right to approve any amendment of a company's charter. Therefore, the power of the general meeting of common shareholders is restricted.
The approval of priority shareholders is also DATA needed for decisions such as hiring or firing of company directors and issuing new common Inspired by the European Community initiative, shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or more shares. Depository receipts are issued by an administrative office to investors after detaching in Dutch listed companies have been required to disclose their holdings publicly since February the voting rights from ordinary shares. The holder of depository receipts has all economic rights 1992. Before that, there was no mandatory disclosure of share ownership, and no way existed attached to common shares, except for the voting right (which rests with the administrative office). even to identify shareholders. 5 The data on blockholdings are collected from the Dutch financial Binding appointments of new directors are made by the management board, thereby strengthening daily Het Financieele Dagblad. In total, we obtained a sample of 177 companies listed on their own control. Ordinary shareholders are, thus, deprived of the possibility to appoint their own the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. These companies represent more than 90 percent of the Dutch stock directors. Only a two-third majority at the shareholders meeting can overrule the binding appoint-market capitalization. Data on takeover defense measures associated with these companies are ment. Limited voting power mechanism restricts the maximum number of votes that can be cast collected from Voogd (1989) and other publications. Our findings are presented in Tables 1  by one shareholder, regardless of the number of shares actually held.
and 2. Table 1 shows that more than 90 percent of Besides the above-mentioned takeover defenses, the issue of preferred defense shares is the Dutch companies are protected by at least one defense measure. We find that while only 16 most widely adopted defense mechanism in the Netherlands. These shares are issued in the name (9%) companies are without any of these defenses, 52 (29%) companies have one defense mechof the holder (usually friendly parties) because of their control function, with only the statutory anism, 62 (35%) firms have two defense mechanisms, and as many as 47 (27%) firms are minimum of 25 percent of par value to be paid up. Even though they are not fully paid up, protected by three or more defense devices. preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. In order to resist any unfriendly 5 Public corporations in the Netherlands issue predominantly bearer shares. takeover attempt, common stockholders authorize announcement of granting an option allowing friendly parties to own preferred shares was made by 12 companies (these 12 companies have taken the first step either during 1984-90 or earlier). The official market is the first-tier market for larger companies, while the parallel market is for smaller companies.
We first divide the aggregate sample into groups with cumulative takeover defense measures, and then determine the average ownership concen- Table 2 presents a list of widely used antitakeover measures in the Netherlands. We find that 105 tration for each group. We calculate ownership concentration of a firm in several ways: the per-(32%) firms have adopted defense mechanism with preferred shares, 79 (24%) firms have issued centage of shares held by the largest blockholder 7 (C 1 ), the share of the three largest blockholders priority shares, 70 (22%) companies have issued depository receipts, 64 (20%) firms have made (C 3 ), and the share of all blockholders (C block ).
We also separately calculate a concentration meabinding appointments of directors, and seven (2%) companies have imposed restrictions on sure (C inst. ) to represent institutional ownership (estimated by blockholdings held by major Dutch voting rights.
After searching sources like the stock exchange banks and insurance companies). On the basis of a t-test we then find out whether average ownerpublication Beursplein 5 and the financial daily Het Financieele Dagblad, we find that 79 new ship concentration significantly varies among groups of companies with different takeover defense mechanisms were announced by Dutch companies during 1984-90. Defense with pre-defenses.
The above analysis is performed by comparing ferred share was the most frequently announced mechanism-on 52 occasions, which represents two sample averages at a time. In order to examine the effect of firms' ownership structure on 66% of the total. The next most important antitakeover devices were the issues of priority shares the likelihood of adopting individual takeover and depository receipts. Both were adopted on seven occasions each. No new defense measure was announced during 1991-92 because of e jt = the error term of stock j in period t. defense, we estimate the following logistic regression: 8 The period to estimate the Market Model parameters is selected as the period of 100 days p (defense measure) = f (ownership concentration) before the start of the event (or announcement) period. We also estimate the parameters using 100 days of data from the postevent period. A Here the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm has a particular defense measure and 0 other-period of 20 days before the announcement until 20 days after the announcement is selected as the wise. Several new proxies are used to calculate ownership concentration. In addition to the four event period. The impact of takeover defense announcements on stock returns is measured over concentration measures defined earlier, we use the logarithmic transformation of these variables this period. The parameters are estimated by using the ordinary least squares method. We use the as well as the Herfindahl measure of concentration in the regression analysis.
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'CBS-Total Return Index' to calculate the market returns used in the model. 10 The abnormal return To examine whether shareholders experience any change in their wealth when new takeover (also called excess return or prediction error) is the difference between the actual return during defense measures are announced, we follow the conventional event study methodology. This the event period (−20, +20) and the return predicted from the estimation period: methodology has been widely used in the financial economics literature (e.g., DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983) .
AR jt = R jt −␣ j −␤ j R mt Recently, it has also become popular in the strategic management literature (e.g., Mahoney and The abnormal returns for individual stocks are then averaged across all stocks to obtain average Mahoney, 1993). The purpose of this method is to estimate the deviation of actual stock returns abnormal returns for each day. The excess returns for each stock are also compounded over different (consequent upon the announcement of a specified event) from expected stock returns. We time intervals around announcement date to calculate cumulative abnormal returns. A t-test is peremploy the Market Model and the Market Adjusted Returns Model to estimate these devi-formed to test whether the average abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. The ations for each stock.
The Market Model supposes that the return on t-value is obtained by dividing average daily abnormal returns by its standard deviation calcuan individual stock is linearly related to the market return. The relationship is written as follows: lated from the estimation period.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we also perform the stock return analysis using R jt = ␣ j + ␤ j R mt + e jt the Market Adjusted Returns Model. The model predicts individual stock return to be equal to the where corresponding market return, or in other words, R jt = the continuously compounded return of stock j in period t; R jt = R mt R mt = the continuously compounded market return in period t; This model is distinct from the Market Model in the sense that here all stocks are assumed to be ␣ j ,␤ j = security specific and time independent parameters; of average risk. The abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual stock return and the corresponding market return:
8 The logistic analysis is chosen here because the dependent variable is a binary, qualitative variable. 9 As the variable C block combines both institutional and blockholders' shares, we have constructed another variable which estimates the share of all blockholders other than those held 10 The CBS-Total Return Index is a value-weighted index representing all listed stocks. It is the only market index by institutional blockholders. The Herfindahl measure was calculated by summing squared percentage of shares owned available in the Netherlands which covers all listed companies.
In addition, the index is adjusted for cash dividends. by each blockholder. AR jt = R jt −R mt find that the largest shareholder has more than 25 percent of shares in 52 percent of the firms in the sample, and more than 50 percent of shares The average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns are then computed as in 22 percent of the firms. A majority of the companies has a blockholding in excess of 50 described previously.
percent. After searching the identity of these blockholders, we find that the average shares of management and family members, companies, and
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
individual blockholders are 8 percent, 20 percent Ownership structure and 5 percent, respectively. The average share of financial institutions (banks and insurance A descriptive analysis on Dutch ownership structure is presented in Table 3 . We find that block-companies) in our sample is almost 10 percent.
The combined share of these investors is less holders hold more than half of all shares in Dutch companies. The average share of the largest than 25 percent for 90 percent of the companies.
The sample contains 18 companies in which blockholder is 31 percent, that of the three largest blockholders is 45 percent, and the average share banks and insurance companies are the only blockholders. The average share of other instiof all blockholders together is 51 percent. It appears that the group with the three largest tutional blockholders is 6 percent.
In Table 4 we present the average ownership shareholders dominates ownership concentration of Dutch firms. The correlations between these concentrations of companies with cumulative defense mechanisms. We also report in the lower variables are, as expected, very high. Our results show that ownership concentration in the Nether-panel corresponding t-values testing the difference in average ownership concentrations. Our results lands is higher than in the U.S.A., the U.K. and Japan, but lower than in Sweden. 11 The variation show that the concentration of the largest shareholder for firms without any defense measure is within each measure of ownership concentration is also higher in the Netherlands. The standard almost 13 percentage points higher than that for firms with only one measure. Similarly, for comdeviation of percentage of shares held by the top five blockholders in our sample is 26 percent panies with one takeover defense device, the concentration of the largest shareholder is 11 percentcompared with Prowse's (1995) findings of 16 percent in the U.S.A. and the U.K. and 14 percent age points higher than that for firms with two devices. Both differences in concentration are in Japan.
Analyzing the distribution of shareholdings, we statistically significant. In general, we find that the lower the ownership concentrations are, the more takeover defenses companies adopt. This 11 Prowse (1995) observe that Swedish firms with high concen- tration of equity ownership rarely adopt antitake-that the results are generally consistent with earlier findings. The probability of a firm adopting over devices. These findings suggest that firms adopt multiple takeover defenses when sharehold-any one takeover defense mechanism is negatively related to ownership concentration. The ings are diffuse. Table 4 also reports the results for institutional finding is robust to all variables used in computing ownership concentration, including the logablockholders (banks and insurance companies). The concentration of these institutional share-rithmic transformations of the Herfindahl measures. The results with institutional concentration holders does not show any particular relationship with multiple takeover defenses. The share of variables alone are, however, once again mixed. these investors in firms with one defense mechanism is five percentage points higher than in Wealth effects firms without any defense. Afterwards, as institutional ownership concentration declines, firms The sample here consists of 44 new preferred defenses announced during 1984-90. 13 Table 6 adopt a higher number of defenses. These differences are not statistically significant. presents the cumulated average abnormal returns based on the Market Model for several intervals Next, we examine if the general finding on the negative relationship between ownership concen-in the event period. The results from the aggregate sample indicate that the announcement of tration and defense mechanisms also holds for individual takeover defenses. The analysis is car-the preferred share defense mechanism is, on average, associated with a decline in common ried out by performing a logit regression. The estimated regression coefficient expresses the share price. During the 2-day announcement period [0, 1], shareholders suffer a statistically relationship between the likelihood of choosing one particular defense mechanism and a measure significant return decline of 1.18 percent. The result is not driven by a few outliers as the of firms' ownership concentration. The results are presented in Table 5 . 12 The reported coefficient number of negative abnormal returns dominates the sample. This is also found to be statistically estimates are obtained from running regressions with one explanatory variable at a time. We find significant at the 5 percent level after conducting 12 Because of space limitation and qualitatively similar find-13 Three measures could not be included in the sample because the market model parameters' estimation period coincided ings, the regression results of only a limited number of variables are presented.
with the event period of a previous measure. a sign test (Z-statistic = 2.34). Over the 6-day of the preferred share issue. This increase in share price could be an indication of a takeover postannouncement period, the cumulative abnormal return is −2.27 percent (with a t-value of attempt that eventually led managers to issue the preferred shares.
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Interestingly, the post-−2.97). 14 Although the above result tends to support announcement periods indicate a significant decline in shareholders' wealth. This decline the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, further analysis of the sample reveals some interesting might provide an estimate of the lost premium incurred by common shareholders-since the findings. We split the aggregate sample into three subsamples based on the three steps followed in chance of eventual takeover was eliminated by actually issuing preferred shares. 18 Our finding is the issuing process. With the announcement of the first step towards defense (creating the possi-consistent with prior studies showing that stock prices increase with takeover bids but then decline bility of preferred share issue), a positive and statistically significant stock price effect is if they do not materialize. In sum, the evidence provided here suggests that, although defense observed. This evidence does not support the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Shareholders measures are beneficial to a certain extent, the benefits do not remain when they are used to do not experience any wealth decline from the charter amendment leading to takeover defense. fend off takeover attempts.
We also examine whether there is a difference On the contrary, they appear to benefit as there is a signficant increase in stock returns (1.23% in the results between the first preferred share issue and a subsequent issue. The issue sample in 2 days).
15 All other postannouncement intervals also reveal positive (but not significant) price is further divided into a subsample of 13 companies that issued preferred shares for the first increases. This result indicates that defense measures are indeed adopted allowing shareholders to time and a subsample of four companies with a subsequent issue. We find that the first issue is benefit from increased takeover premiums. The almost negligible stock price impact with respect more damaging for shareholders. The abnormal return in the 5-day postannouncement period is to the second step announcement is not surprising, since granting a purchase option to a friendly −7.03 percent (t-value = −3.88) in case of the first-time issue, compared to −4.37 percent (tparty is an obvious outcome of the charter amendment. value = −2.71) in case of a subsequent issue. This difference is statistically very significant (with a Another interesting finding is obtained when we look at the third step of the defense process. t-value of −6.24).
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Other postannouncement return intervals show similar results. The negative announcement effect of the aggregate sample is in fact determined by the issue of the preferred share itself. We find that the announcement of a preferred share issue is associated with a strong excess decline in stock 17 The increase in stock price followed by a decline on the returns (−4.09%), which is statistically significant announcement of share issue could also be seen as an indi-(with a t-value of −4.94). For the 6-day period cation of the breakdown of takeover negotiations. To verify [0, 5] , the excess decline in shareholders' wealth this, we searched the financial press throughout the event period, and found no report on any negotiation. This, of amounts to 6.40 percent. 16 However, we find a course, does not rule out the possibility of undisclosed inforsignificant price increase before the announcement mation. 18 We also searched the financial press to check if any specific event followed the announcement, but were unable to find any. 19 We also investigate whether the market reaction varies with 14 The finding is robust as the two other methodologies (the Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model using firms' ownership concentration. The sample is divided into three portfolios: portfolio 1 contains firms with the lowest postevent period data) show that stock prices decline by 1.50 percent and 1.85 percent, respectively. concentration, portfolio 3 contains those with the highest concentration, and portfolio 2 is between them. We do not 15 The Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model using postevent period data show that stock prices increase find statistically significant differences in cumulative abnormal returns among these portfolios. Therefore, the results are not by 1.33 percent and 1.27 percent, respectively. 16 Once again, the results are materially indifferent to one reported here. A cross-sectional regression between ownership structure and announcement period abnormal returns also particular methodology used in calculating abnormal returns. The Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model yields insignificant results. Our analysis, however, should be interpreted with caution because the sample size is small and using postevent period data also show a decline in stock returns (−5.06% and −5.62%, respectively) .
only one defense mechanism is examined.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
conflict between shareholders and managers. Other such mechanisms include the capital market, the market for corporate control, the manaThis paper empirically analyzes the relationship gerial labor market and the product market. Similar to Walsh and Seward (1990) , we believe that of takeover defenses with firms' ownership structure and shareholders' wealth. A sample of Dutch much can be learned about one control mechanism when it is analyzed in and around another industrial companies is selected for the study. The Dutch scenario is particularly interesting because mechanism. Managers in the Netherlands seem to be immune from the disciplinary threat of the almost all listed companies have adopted multiple takeover defenses. market for corporate control. Since the takeover market is just one disciplinary mechanism, we We find that firms with a relatively lower ownership concentration are the ones with a larger would expect other control mechanisms to be at work too. Our results in this paper demonstrate number of defense measures. Our analysis suggests that firms with disperse ownership adopt this-for example, monitoring by concentrated ownership. As Prowse (1995) points out, concenmore defense tactics. The analysis also shows that the likelihood for a firm to adopt takeover trated shareholdings are important because they provide investors with both the incentive and the defenses is inversely and significantly related to ownership concentration. The result is robust to ability to monitor and influence the management.
Without such concentration, again other mechdifferent ways of measuring ownership concentration. Overall, our evidence is consistent with anisms of corporate control must be relied upon.
It is usually believed that institutional investors the hypothesis that company management is more likely to adopt defensive measures when a firm find it in their best interest to more effectively monitor company managers. In the U.S.A., instiis characterized by diffuse shareholdings. We do not find any significant relationship associated tutional shareholdings have increased over the last years, and a few institutional shareholders with institutional stock ownership. The evidence provided here, therefore, does not strongly sup-have emerged as very active monitors. The findings of Duggal and Millar (1994) suggest that port the hypothesis that institutional shareholders provide better monitoring than other blockholders. researchers should better split aggregate institutional ownership into different categories to We also conduct a stock return analysis in the case of defense with preferred share-the most obtain correct results. The results of this study show that in the Netherlands institutional sharewidely used takeover defense device in recent years in the Netherlands. Our results indicate holders like banks and insurance companies do not have large holdings, and these have no two opposing effects of defense on shareholders' wealth: in one situation, the stock market reacts relationship with the adoption of antitakeover devices. An implication of this finding is that positively, seemingly to allow managers to bargain for a higher premium in takeover bids. In active monitoring by institutional shareholders may not take place in many countries. It is highly another situation, the stock market reacts negatively as potential takeover attempt appears to unlikely that Dutch institutional shareholders lack the expertise and the ability to serve as effective be eliminated.
Alternative disciplinary mechanisms have been monitors. Rather, the presence of small stakes may explain why passivity remains the norm. It an area of extensive scrutiny. In this paper, we document that low (high) ownership concen-is also possible that active institutional monitoring may not be a representation of the general pattern tration is associated with greater (smaller) use of antitakeover devices which affect the functioning in the U.S.A.
There are many types of defense measures, and of the market for corporate control. We also provide evidence on the existence of positive and their effects also depend on situation like the manner in which a particular device is introduced. negative share price effects of takeover defense measures. Some implications of our findings are Our analysis shows that it is difficult to say a priori whether defense measures are good or bad discussed below.
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